WW II November 1944 28th division in the Hurtgen Forest "FOLLOW ME AND DIE"

Description: I COMBINE SHIPPING $1.50 per book. FREE SHIPPING for orders over $60. Send books to your check-out cart. E-Bay will automatically adjust shipping costs. PACKAGING & SHIPPING RULES: 1. Individual books Under $18.00 are shipped in padded poly envelopes. 2. Individual books Over $18.00 are shipped in a poly envelope inside a box. 3. Buy Three or more books and the order is shipped in a box.ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THIS LISTING:From a Book Review: The tragedy of the Hurtgen Forest was a result of an overly optimistic Allied command convincing itself that the German Army's rout from France the previous summer was a harbinger of the end of the war similar to what had occurred in 1918. Believing that the Germans were nearly finished, the Allied commanders repeatedly underestimated German willingness to significantly resist the Allies as they advanced into Germany. The result was bloody nose after bloody nose for Allied efforts in Autumn 1944 as Allied commanders launched poorly supported, poorly supplied, and poorly thought-out operations against determined German resistance. The victims of this gross overconfidence were the ordinary Allied combat soldiers and those men are the subject of Cecil Currey's 1984 book, "Follow Me and Die: The Destruction of an American Division in World War II."The division that is the subject of Currey's book is the U.S. 28th Infantry Division, a Pennsylvania National Guard outfit, nicknamed the "Keystone Division" due to its divisional insignia being a bright-red version of Pennsylvania's state emblem. Its horrific losses in the Hurtgen combined with its insignia's shape and color would earn the division a new nickname: the "Bloody Bucket." The 28th had fought in Normandy, paraded down Paris' Champs d'Elysee, and helped drive the Germans out of France. In early November 1944, it was tasked with clearing the Hurtgen Forest in order to protect the right flank of U.S. VII Corps as it drove towards the Rhine through the Stolberg corridor. The merits of attacking into the Hurtgen were always suspect. The rugged terrain and poor road net combined with miserable weather made it a very questionable place to launch any significant assault.Yet, the 28th assaulted it. Currey describes the 28th's efforts to attack through minefields and barbwire covered by machine-guns in bunkers and pre-sighted artillery. The thick woods and weather nullified the US Army's biggest advantages: air support, artillery, and mobility. It seemed almost everywhere the 28th was stopped short of its objectives, but then it found a "soft spot" in the German line enabling it to seize three villages that controlled the region's few roads. Unfortunately, this "soft spot" was more akin to one sticking one's head in a noose. The 28th found itself grossly overextended relying on an easily interdicted forest track as its main supply route, under clear observation by German artillery spotters, and vulnerable to strong German armored counterattacks. The result was a disaster with the division suffering appalling losses and being driven-back in defeat.Currey finds plenty of blame to go around. He sharply criticizes both 1st US Army commander, Courtney Hodges, and V Corps commander, Leonard Gerow. And he's very critical of the 28th's commander, Norman "Dutch" Cota. Cota's career was checkered. As the assistant division commander of the 29th Infantry Division, he had been one of the undoubted heroes of Omaha Beach. (Actor Robert Mitchum played him in "The Longest Day.") However, as commander of the 28th, he would preside over its near immolation in the Hurtgen and then its near annihilation during the Bugle. Cota comes across as a commander who didn't want to see and hear bad news. And there was nothing but bad news coming out of the Hurtgen.Criticism of high command is nothing new in a military history book, but where Currey differs is that he doesn't hesitate to call-out ANYONE. Usually, most military history books avoid identifying low ranking soldiers and officers who don't perform well in combat. Not Currey. Using US Army interviews of Hurtgen survivors conducted shortly after the battle as his main source, he unhesitatingly names field and line grade officers, NCOs, and private soldiers who ran away, panicked, broke-down, or attempted to fortify their courage with alcohol. This book was published in 1984 and assumingly many of these men were still alive. Yet, Currey pulls no punches. It really is a bit shocking.One example is Currey practically accusing the commander of a tank destroyer battalion attached to the 28th of cowardice and dereliction of duty for his repeated disobedience of orders sending his lightly-armored and open-topped vehicles (and their exposed crews) into situations in which he believed they were unsuited. Another example is the naming of an infantry company commander who apparently drank gasoline in order to get evacuated to the rear!This is mostly the 28th's version of the battle. Currey does attempt to give a limited view "from the other side of the hill" with brief descriptions of how the Germans viewed the battle, but it's clear Currey's research into the German records wasn't very deep. These segments feel more like afterthoughts in comparison to the rest of the narrative.

Price: 19 USD

Location: Livonia, Michigan

End Time: 2024-11-29T16:50:00.000Z

Shipping Cost: 5.4 USD